This article is the result of investigations which indicated that conditions, particularly safety management, at power system control centres were either contributing factors or causal factors in the large-scale blackouts which occurred in 2003 all over the developed world. An exploratory research methodology was followed in an attempt to determine the baseline level of safety management within the control centres along with the applicability of the safety management concepts. The experience survey developed followed a flexible line of questioning which illuminated the context and produced both quantitative and qualitative data. The results indicated that there was no support for the proposition that the control centre business environment is becoming more complex and the risk management was not adequate; neither was there support for the proposition that the risk management strategies were based on more than one class of accident model. There was however support for the proposition that control centres do not use systemic accident models on which to base their accident prevention techniques.
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, a number of large-scale blackouts occurred in the developed world (Pourbeik et al., 2006; Paserba and Kundar, 2006) . These large disturbances highlighted once again the importance of energy facilities in these societies and the impact on modern life when a performance failure occurs (Dagle, 2006) . Investigations indicated that conditions at the power system control centres were either contributing factors or causal factors in the blackouts (U.S.-Canada Power System outage Task Force, 2004) and prompted a review of control room facilities by utilities, regulators and by industry research institutions (Pourbeik et al., 2006; NERC, 2004) .
Within South Africa, the potential for a blackout and the performance of the National control centre was reviewed. Control centres are responsible for the safe, secure and economical operation of the bulk electrical energy infrastructure in the country. The National control centre is a continuous real-time operation and its focus is to monitor and control the power system on a second by second basis. It achieves these objectives by actively Abbreviation: SCADA, Supervisory control and data acquisition. supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) intervening in the energy delivery process via advanced computer systems (Kundar, 1994) .
The study, forming the basis of this article, explores the safety management in power system control centres. It is anticipated that an exploration of the accident prevention techniques, specifically accident analysis and accident prediction will highlight improvement opportunities at these critical installations. By identifying how power system control centres learn from their accidents, manage their risks and improve their capabilities within the broad field of safety management, the factors essential to good performance may be clarified.
Ultimately, this will contribute towards the managerial skills required to sustain the reliability and performance of power system control centres. The quality of the human interventions into the power system supervisory process depends on the knowledge and skills base of the control staff. Any errors in mental models and subsequent incident diagnosis or execution on behalf of the human operators can lead to a disturbance in the power system and potentially the loss of human life. In addition, the risk of latent defects in the control centres' organisational processes is a notable contributing factor towards errorinducing situations for the control centre staff to deal with.
In summary, the study tried to assess the safety management in power system control centres within the context of their business environments, with a specific focus on the assessment of the business environment of control centres as well as how accidents are prevented at control centres.
The study was limited to the Eskom system operator and an international peer group of system operators belonging to the CIGRE study committee on power system and control and applied the existing body of safety management theory specifically to power system control centres in the electrical supply industry and assess the existing safety management practices used.
LITERATURE REVIEW
"Modern systems are of many kinds. There are social systems, institutional systems, technical systems and systems that combine components from these plus many more. An example of such a technological system is an electric power system consisting of not only power plants, transmission lines and various loads, but also utility corporations, government agencies, and other institutions. Problems cannot be neatly categorised as financial, technical or managerial; instead they constitute a seamless web; engineering and technical improvements also require financial assistance to fund these improvements and managerial competence to implement them" (Casazza and Delea, 2003) .
With this quote, Casazza and Delea (2003) highlight the complexity of the electricity power industry today. It raises the issue that an essential service delivery provider impacts many players in society from policy makers, regulators, financiers, suppliers and most importantly consumers of electricity.
It is critical that the utility management is competent and that they engage appropriately with the systemic nature of the problems they address. Brunsdon and Dalziell (2005) state that an organisation's ability to respond effectively to adverse events depends on their structure, the management and operational systems they have in place, and the collective resilience of these. With this in mind, the recent spate of blackouts in 2003 raises questions regarding management capability and focus.
Whenever major power system blackouts happen, the resultant societal inquiry always focuses on whether investment levels could have been improved to prevent an outage (Paserba and Kundar, 2006) . Levenson (2004) notes that in this increasingly complex and interrelated societal structure, the responsibility for safety levels in an industry is shifting back from the individual to government; hence, the calls for greater regulatory oversight of electric utilities.
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The public protection is that, government has to provide varies for different industry types. Amalberti (2006) notes the four levels of expectations, from ultra performing systems, egoistic systems, and collective expectation systems to ultra safe systems, that society has the various types of industries. Where customers do not have a direct choice of service there is a collective expectation of the safety level that the industry will deliver (Amalberti, 2006) . The electric power system falls into this category.
Electric power must be produced and used immediately (Yoon and Ilic, 2001; Casazza and Delea, 2003) . This key feature of electricity delivery requires the constant monitoring and controlling of the power system to meet the continually changing demand from the customer (Kundar, 1994) . SCADA systems provide information about the current status of the plant in order to indicate the real-time status of the power system (Kundar, 1994) .
The human operator is an important link at various levels of this power system control hierarchy (Kundar, 1994) . The primary function of the power system operator is to monitor system performance and manage resources so as to ensure economic operation while maintaining the required quality and reliability of power supply (Kundar, 1994; David and Wen, 2001) . During normal operation, the power system operator is responsible for ensuring that all constraints are respected while maintaining system frequency and system voltage within an acceptable range (David and Wen, 2001) . During system emergencies, the power system operator plays a key role in co-ordinating related information from diverse sources and developing corrective strategies to restore the system to a more secure state of operation (Kundar, 1994) .
Safety management
In the early days of industrial accident analysis (up to 1970) , the three main causes of accidents were ascribed to technical failure, human error and other failures. Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a growing evolution of the principles for organisational resilience and in the understanding of factors that determine human and organisational performance (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006) . With the refinement of the role technical, human and organisational factors play in safety, there was also a shift in safety management from reactive to pro-active control of these factors (Hollnagel, 2007) .
A definition of safety management is that it is a process in which industries and producers, societal representtatives and the public interact to find a balance between the benefits, costs and risk of products, activities and processes (Svenson et al., 2006) . More simply stated, Leveson (2002) defines safety to be "freedom from accidents". Similarly, Hornby (1974) defines safety as "freedom from danger and risks". Reason (2000) states that this definition of safety is paradoxically defined by its absence and that a more appropriate definition of safety would be the "ability of individuals or organisations to deal with risks and hazards so as to avoid damage or losses and yet still achieve their goals". Hollnagel and Woods (2006) define safety to be "a dynamic non-event". The most recent definition of safety is based on the emerging field of resilience engineering and it states that safety is the "ability to predict, plan, and act, so as to sustain continuous operation" (Hollnagel, 2007) . Within a company, the key value that safety management will add depends on the culture of an organisation, its industry type and the applicable regulatory oversight.
One of the key outputs of a safety management system is the understanding of what constitutes an accident and what constitutes the prevention thereof. In order to prevent accidents, an organisation has to be able to learn from an incident. There are two components to learn from; the accident analysis after an event and the pre-emptive risk identification (Levenson, 1995) . Both of these components are based on accident models.
An accident model is a stereotypical way of thinking about how an accident occurs. To be useful a model has to fulfil two requirements, namely, it has to provide an explanation so that mitigating actions can be devised and it has to be done at a reasonable investment in intellectual effort, time and resources (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006) .
The advantage of an accident model is that we can communicate and understand each other efficiently with the reference framework of a model (Hollnagel, 2004) . A model helps us to determine which information to look for and brings some kind of order to chaos by providing the means by which relationships can be explained (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006) . Leveson (1995) notes that the model is an abstraction that allows us to communicate to others, an understanding of complex phenomena. These models need to have predictive and explanatory power and the assumptions underlying them need to be understood if an effective safety management program is to be developed (Levenson, 1995) . The disadvantage of an accident model however, is that it encourages one common view of a set of events (Hollnagel, 2004) . In addition, a very powerful model very quickly becomes second nature and the simplifications it embodies are no longer recognised (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006) .
When an accident happens, we look for certainty in the cause more than an explanation of the accident. Rather than accepting that an underlying mechanism may be random, people will invent all kinds of explanations whether rational, scientific, emotional, religious, irrational or superstitious to reduce the uncertainty of future events (Hollnagel, 2004) . Leveson (1995) also states that it is rare that the causes of an accident are perceived identically by corporate executives, engineers, union officials or any other actor within the organisational hierarchy. In addition she also states that the accident causes are perceived differently by external parties such as the press, state, regulators or victims. The main purpose of understanding accidents is to devise effective ways of preventing them (Levenson, 1995) . In order to do this we need to have a working model of what causes an accident (Hollnagel, 2004; Levenson, 1995) .
Risk management
Accident prediction is more commonly known in organisations as risk management. Hollnagel (2004) notes that a fundamental requirement of accident's prediction is the ability to understand risk and to appreciate the reality of risk exposure, without being blinded by hope, fear or hindsight. For business today the risk scan is global and evolving constantly and any systemic risk cannot be assessed in isolation from others as these risks potentially reinforce one another through complex interactions.
The value of performing risk assessments in organisations is that, once an understanding develops of what can go wrong in an environment, a response can be developed to prevent those failures occurring. While in a socio-technical system like a power system control centre, the predominant risk is operational risk. This entails failure of operational effectiveness or service delivery due to either inadequate processes or inadequate adaptation to external challenges. While it is hard to predict and quantify operational risk, poor management in this arena will affect all aspects of a company's success (Levenson, 2004; Hollnagel, 2004) .
The key to effective safety management in these complex and dynamic environments is adequate feedback mechanisms (Rosness et al., 2004) . Effective feedback mechanisms should be based on understanding how work is actually performed versus how it is imagined to be performed (Dekker, 2006) . To monitor the risk of major accidents occurring is quite difficult as these events are rare and do not provide a continuous or a useful feedback mechanism. Solving this problem could be approached by monitoring either the trend in known root causes of previous incidents or, by monitoring risks based on a risk model arising out of known accident models (Levenson, 2004; Hollnagel, 2004) . Three risk models are:
1. The sequential accident model, which places an emphasis on the structural decomposability and linear nature of an accident. 2. The epidemiological risk model of the organisation, where an accident is conceptualised as being analogous to the spread of disease. 3. The systemic accident model emphasises the performance variability and the co-incidence of events, where risk monitoring focuses on identifying unexpected performance variability.
Based on the literature review, a modification to the generic risk management systems proposed by Hollnagel (2007) is suggested. This modified model incorporates the reactive and proactive feedback loops developed in Hollnagel's (2007) safety management system with the systems thinking concepts of Dalziell and McManus (2004) as well as Svenson et al. (2006) .
Specifically this modified safety management system is expressly applicable at industry level as it requires, as input to the socio-technical system, the societal expectation level of safety. Based on this societal expectation level, the socio-technical systems has means of intervention available to manage its' technical, human and organisational factors.
The fundamental key to this modified safety management system is the use of a range of accident models appropriate to the sub-system being analysed or the use of a range of accident models to gain different perspectives of the way in which things can go wrong in that sub-system. Three propositions, based on the literature search, have emerged:
1. The control centre business environment has become more complex and the risk management techniques are not adequate. 2. At control centres, the accident investigations are not based on the systemic class of accident models. 3. The risk management strategies used in control centres are based on more than one class of accident model.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study was to examine the safety management in power system control centres. It was an exploratory type of study as it was attempting to do the following: 1. Determine the baseline level of safety management within a specific type of socio-technical system such as power system control centres, and 2. Explore the applicability of the safety management concepts from high-risk industries to power system control centres.
The initial management dilemma identified was the need for improved safety management systems after the 2003 large-scale power system blackouts. The concept of applying safety management practices from other industries to power systems was raised by Hollnagel (2004) when discussing the efficacy of applying barrier systems to prevent unwanted events from occurring unexpectedly, hence the focus on exploring the current safety management practices in power system control centres based on Rijamampianina 4365
the concepts found in the safety management practices of high-risk industries.
The scope of the study is more of a contextual analysis of the safety management practices (Cooper and Schindler, 2001 ) than a statistical study. It can also be considered a cross-sectional study as the results will represent a snapshot of safety management in power system control centres today (Cooper and Schindler, 2001) . Welman and Kruger (1999) note that the intent of exploratory research is to assess whether or not a phenomenon exists, as well as to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon being identified. By trying to understand how power system control centres are managing the safety of their socio-technical system and by trying to determine the influences on safety management practices, it is believed that this conforms to the definition of exploratory research.
According to Cooper and Schindler (2001) to adequately engage in an exploratory investigation, qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used. However, there is a preference for qualitative techniques in an exploratory study. Cooper and Schindler (2001) noted that to meet the objectives of the exploratory research, the emphasis should be on defining what is being done or what the meaning of something is versus an emphasis on defining how much is being done or the measure of something. Cooper and Schindler (2001) also note that to perform exploratory studies in the management arena, the four techniques of secondary data analysis, experience surveys, focus groups and two-stage design are particularly suitable. In this research design, the two techniques adopted were an analysis of secondary data in conjunction with interviews to develop an experience survey.
Population and sample
The total population in this research is considered to be all power system control centres that manage large high-voltage networks and that are responsible for securely delivering bulk electricity. The sampling method used in this research is an unrestricted nonprobability or convenience sample (Cooper and Schindler, 2001 ) as all members and observers of the CIGRE study committee on power system operation and control received the survey questionnaire. This sampling method was very practical as the contact details of all the members and observers control centres were available and a working relationship already exists to explore questions of common interest to power system operators. In terms of the profile of the sample, it is believed that this group of power system operators represent all the major dimensions of the total population. The dimensions of the total population include power system operators from the developed or developing world, privatised or state-owned operators and national or regional power system operators of largescale or small-scale power systems. Cooper and Schindler (2001) noted that an experience survey is very useful when we are trying to seek information from people familiar with an area and we are trying to tap into their knowledge and collective memories. The system operators have different cultural perceptions of risk and a different understanding of safety management concepts. Hence the survey design included openended questions at the end of each closed question to tease out any specific context to the closed question answer.
Design of the experience survey
The first stage of developing the survey questionnaire was to interview the head the ESKOM national control centre to determine the depth of the safety management practices at the main control centre in the country. Based on the discussion results and the secondary data analysis, the first version of the experience survey was developed. This was presented to the C2 working group annual meeting in August 2006 and critical feedback was received.
Based on this critical feedback a second version of the experience survey was developed. This survey was piloted with a specialist from the ESKOM system operator who spent time filling in the questionnaire and who provided critical feedback on the difficulty of responding to the questions. In addition the second version of the experience survey was reviewed by a member of the Norwegian and British system operator who was interested in the topic and available to meet the author during the C2 working group meeting in June 2007. After this feedback the questionnaire was modified for the third time and distributed to the targeted sample.
Data collection
The survey was distributed via e-mail and the targeted sample was given one month to respond. A total of thirteen responses were received and it was deemed an acceptable sample return. The profiles of the respondents include operators of large-scale and small-scale power systems in both the developed and developing countries. In addition, the respondents were senior members of their organisations. There were three respondents from developing countries (Brazil, India and South Africa) and ten respondents from developed countries. Two respondents (Japan and Israel) operate isolated transmission grid while eleven operate interconnected power systems with neighbouring countries.
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
The Likert scale questions produced ordinal level data for analysis. To explore single variables, simple descriptive statistics (tables of frequencies) were calculated. To explore associations between ordinal level variables, twoway contingency tables by cross-tabulation was used. To measure the association between the variables, the pvalue was determined with Fisher's exact test using a Monte Carlo simulation. This exact calculation of the pvalue with Fisher's exact test was possible because the sample size was below 20 and only 2 x 2 crosstabulations were being produced (Cooper and Schindler, 2001 ). In addition, because of the small sample size, the significance level was chosen as 0.1 rather than the traditional 0.05. A significance test is required to determine whether any relationship between variables found in a sample is likely to apply to the population from which the sample is drawn (Cooper and Schindler, 2001) . Therefore, it could be inferred that the relationship between associated variables was applicable at population level and not just at sample level for any pvalue below 0.1. The probability of making a type 1 error (rejecting a hypothesis when it is true) has thus been set to 10% in this study.
According to Welman and Kruger (1999) , content analysis is a systematic way in which a source of information is reviewed to record the relative incidences of themes and the way in which the themes are presented. In this research, the open-ended questions asked in the experience survey will be analysed with a coding regime and then reviewed for contextual information. The coding regime is related to the concepts discussed in the literature review and specifically in the modified safety management model.
Validity and reliability
To ensure validity of the questionnaire in this experience survey, use was made of both closed and open-ended questions to extract maximum context information around an issue. In addition, if the respondents felt uneasy about the amount of information that they were revealing about their control centre, the option was clearly indicated to list a non-committal "no comment" answer. Two sets of related questions were developed to explore safety management constructs. To test for reliability and specifically the internal consistency of these questions (Cooper and Schindler, 2001) , the Cronbach's coefficient alpha was calculated. This is a measure of the internal consistency of a test and the index shows the degree to which all the items in the test are measuring the same attribute (Welman and Kruger, 1999) .
The other clear attempt to ensure information validity, given that the questions were quite difficult and introspective on the control room practices, the option was clearly made available for a person to indicate a noncommittal 'don't know' answer.
Furthermore, to ensure validity of the questionnaire, the design of the questionnaire, the sequencing of the questions and the word choice used was tested with different members to the official questionnaire respondents of the South African, British and Norwegian system operators before the final questionnaire was distributed. The locally available respondent was again consulted after all completed questionnaires were returned, to verify that the concepts in the survey were understood and that his responses were unchanged.
In this particular research, it is expected that the closed question responses would remain reliable. However it is assumed that the responses to the open-ended questions would evolve as the respondents gain deeper insight to safety management concepts, hence the stability of the instrument is not critical. Lastly, reliability of the survey instrument was furthered by using several questions to test the same concepts.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The questionnaire was too long, was requesting information unrelated to the propositions and the formulation of some of the questions was poor.
The concepts being explored by the Likert-scale technique were multi-dimensional. Unfortunately, the techniques for determining consistency of multivariate ordinal data to explore multi-dimensional concept are still in development stage (Wittkowski, 2003) . Hence, this analysis was restricted to more basic and established inferential techniques to explore the multi-dimensional concepts. If the questionnaire structure had been different and the concepts simpler, and if a larger sample had been achieved, more complex inferential statistics could have been applied.
Quantitative results
In the following section the descriptive statistics of eleven questions will be presented and discussed. The first group of questions (Q3a, Q3b, Q3e, Q3f, Q3g, Q3h) relate to different aspects of the control centre business environment. The second group of questions (Q3i, Q3j, Q3k, Q3l, Q3m) relate to the risk management strategies implemented at a control centre. Based on the descriptive statistics presented, it is concluded that power system control centres have the following profile:
1. A risk monitoring approach that was adequate to good. 2. A risk profile that did not often materialize. 3. A senior leadership that understood their risks very well. 4. A group of key external stakeholders who understood their risks. 5. A perception of organisation risk factors that has shifted moderately to dramatically in the last 10 years. 6. A perception of technical risk factors that has shifted dramatically in the last 10 years. 7. A fair level of barrier implementation. 8. A fair level of following up on emergent risks. 9. A fair level of feedback to different decision-making authorities. 10. A fair level of implementing structural preconditions to respond to problems. 11. A fair level of implementing cultural preconditions for organisational learning.
It is clear that patterns were emerging in the descriptive data. These patterns were investigated by means of cross-tabulations of all the related questions. The patterns that emerged from the data around the six variables related to risk monitoring, risks materialising, understanding level by both leadership and key external stakeholders and the perception change in organisational and technical factors, was expected theoretically. The patterns that emerged from the data around the five Rijamampianina 4367 different ways in which risk could be monitored and contained in control centres was not expected but on further reflection, the responses were consistent. So for example in the author's perception, an organisation that maintains a positive learning culture would be more receptive to the idea of information feedback across different hierarchical levels. In addition an organisation that is comfortable with implementing barriers would be receptive to the idea of reconfiguring resources as another barrier to contain a particular risk. Based on the inferential statistics presented, it is concluded that power system control centres have the following profile:
1. Where there is a fair to good level of risk monitoring, the risks very often do not or rarely materialise. 2. Where the leadership understand the risks, the risks very often do not or rarely materialise. 3. Where the key external stakeholders understand the risks, the risks very often do not or rarely materialise. 4. Where the leadership understand the risks, the key stakeholders understand the risks. 5. Where the perception of moderate to dramatic change in organisational risks factors have occurred, the risks very often do not or rarely materialise. 6. Where the perception of moderate to dramatic change in the organisational factors influencing risk, the perception of change in the technical factors influencing risk was also moderate to dramatic. 7. Where barrier methods as a risk monitoring strategy were being implemented, the structural preconditions for organisational redundancy were also being implemented. 8. Where follow up on emergent risks as a risk monitoring strategy was being implemented, feedback across different decision-making levels was also being implemented. 9. Where follow up on emergent risks as a risk monitoring strategy was being implemented, the structural preconditions for organisational redundancy were also being implemented. 10. Where feedback across different decision-making levels was being implemented as a risk reduction strategy, the cultural preconditions for organisational learning were also being implemented.
Qualitative results
The open-ended questions were coded based on the theoretical concepts discussed in the literature review. In general all the questions were well answered. Where respondents did not respond to the question it either indicated a difficulty in verbalising the answers or that the question was not understood. Based on the qualitative results discussed, the following summary can be drawn about the profile of the majority of the power system operators:
1. Their risk identification of the control centres appears to be based on the sequential class of accident models. 2. They largely consider component failure risk in the technical domain is their predominant risk factor. 3. Where they consider social factors at all, the approach in identifying risk factors is to look for weaknesses, implying the use of epidemiological class of accident model. 4. They largely all experienced a decline in tolerance level for power outages in recent years and this confirms the collective expectation category of safety for the power industry. 5. That they are not sure how accident investigators determine root causes and this implies that they do not know what accident analysis principles are being used in their environment. 6. That in their environment accident causation is ascribed to human, technological or organisational factors. 7. That the range of risk reduction strategies applied is based on the sequential class of accident model. 8. That they had experienced surprises in their environment as they could all largely engage with the question on how to deal with "unknown unknowns". 9. That they were not clear on how communication to ensure alignment of mental models can be a risk reduction strategy. 10. That they all used barrier implementation and monitoring methods. 11. That they all viewed a culture of learning as a risk reduction strategy. 12. That they all tried to make conflicting objectives visible by means of barriers. 13. That they all viewed an error-tolerant culture as a risk reduction strategy.
Interpretation of the results
Based on the consistency of the responses from the different power system operators, various conclusions were made:
1. There is a collective expectation of safety around the power system. 2. The majority of the sample had indicated that within the last 10 years their perception of the technological and organisational risks factors had changed moderately to dramatically. 3. The business environment of power system control centres has changed and become more complex within the last 10 years. This is due to the industry restructuring, a higher utilisation of the power system and a decrease in the tolerance of power outages by society. In addition the leadership and key stakeholders do understand the security of supply inherent in the power system. 4. The majority of the control centres use a sequential class of accident model and that a few use an epidemiological class of accident model. 5. The main factors contributing to accident causation were technologic al and human factors however most of the control centres perceived their regular threats to be of a technical nature. 6. The control centres were using all five risk monitoring strategies presented.
Based on the cross-tabulation results it was also clear that certain combinations of the risk monitoring strategies were likely to be used together.
1. The majority of the respondents had no exposure to whether their accident model is in fact capturing accident details properly. 2. The risk management processes at their control centres are effective. In addition the majority of the sample report that their risks do not often or rarely materialize. 3. Are satisfied with their risk management even though they indicated a need for more real-time analytical tools. 4. Using risk reduction strategies based on an underlying assumption of component failures. This implies that the risk model was based on the sequential class of accident models. In addition the majority of the sample indicated that a risk reduction focus on the technical and human factors that could contribute to accidents. 5. The respondents did not understand the full extent to which communication could be a means of risk reduction as this questioned was not answered as theoretically expected.
Conclusion
This study was undertaken because of a perceived problem in the risk management approach used in power system control centres. The results have demonstrated that the business environment has changed but that control centres perceive their risk management to be adequate. The results have also demonstrated that sequential and epidemiological accident models are being used for accident prevention in power system control centres. It is recommended that management become aware of the limitations of these accident models and that management broaden their understanding of accident prevention and the assumptions that support this activity. This will broaden the range of responses developed in control centres to cope with uncertainty.
The propositions tested in this study were multidimensional. The approach followed to support or reject the propositions was to build up evidence systematically. P 1 : The control centre environment has become more complex and the risk management techniques are no longer adequate.
Based on the results, it is concluded that proposition 1 is not supported since the business environment has indeed become more complex but the risk management techniques are still adequate. However, if this proposition was split into two propositions with the business environment and the risk management strategies considered separately the decision would have been different. Hence a proposition stating that the business environment of control centres has become more complex would have been supported. However a proposition stating that the risk management in control centres is inadequate would have been rejected. P 2 : At control centres the accident investigations are not based on the systemic class of accident models. It is concluded that proposition 2 is supported. P 3 : The risk management strategies used in control centres are based on more than one class of accident model.
It is concluded that proposition 3 is not supported since the risk monitoring strategies are based on the sequential class of accident models and the risk monitoring is based on the sequential and the epidemiological class of accident models.
However, if this proposition was split into two propositions with the risk monitoring and risk reduction strategies considered separately then the decision would have been different. Hence a proposition stating that the risk monitoring is based on more than one class of accident model would have been rejected. However, a proposition stating that the risk reduction strategies are based on more than one class of accident model would have been supported.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Many areas of further research became evident during this study; however the key recommendation for further study would be in the development of systemic accident models appropriate to the power system operation realtime environment.
Thus, for accident investigation and risk management, an appropriate adaptation of an existing systemic model could be investigated. In addition resilience building, which is a response to systemic risk management, is an Rijamampianina 4369 area that could be investigated.
